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Near East and South Asia Review



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25X1

10 May 1985

Page

Articles

India: The Tarapur Reactors—Harmony and Risks

1

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The longstanding US-Indian dispute over fuel supplies and the application of safeguards at the US-supplied Tarapur nuclear power reactors has become a nonissue for the Rajiv Gandhi government because of New Delhi's desire to improve relations with Washington and its ability to resolve many technical problems indigenously.

25X1

India: Where Are the MIG-29s?

3

25X1

25X1

Moscow may be dragging its heels on the sale and delivery of MIG-29 fighters to India, probably to build up its inventory, but also to limit the danger of technology transfer to the West, assess Rajiv Gandhi's alleged pro-Western attitudes, and forestall pressures for the MIG-29 from other Third World states.

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Iran: Life Under the Clerics

7

25X1

25X1

Iranian travelers depict Iran as a nation suffering from economic deterioration, war weariness, and disillusionment with a government widely perceived as corrupt and incompetent, but none believe the regime faces any immediate threat to its survival.

25X1

Iran: The Grand Ayatollahs of Qom

9

25X1

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The influential grand ayatollahs of Qom are discreetly backing antiwar protests to gain support for their conservative views, and their influence is likely to increase after Ayatollah Khomeini dies, since his heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, lacks Khomeini's popular support and religious stature.

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
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Secret

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Muslim Brotherhood: New Phase, New Threat

21

25X1

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The Muslim Brotherhood's current emphasis on political moderation, education, and recruitment of youth is designed to increase its popular appeal and to reduce government harassment. These new tactics are most evident in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank.

25X1

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Afghan Subversion in the North-West Frontier Province

23

25X1

25X1

Kabul is trying to exploit traditional tribal rivalries in the North-West Frontier Province to put pressure on Islamabad to change its policy toward Afghanistan and to disrupt insurgent activities in the border area, but this destabilization program has little chance of success.

25X1

Sri Lanka: The Tamil Insurgency and Changes in Sinhalese Elites

27

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Since 1948, Sri Lanka's elite has become overwhelmingly Sinhalese, heavily Buddhist, and increasingly lower caste and less educated as well as more nationalistic, more chauvinistic, and more provincial in its world view and values, and recent political events demonstrate the effects of these changes on relations between Tamils and Sinhalese.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,

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Articles

India: The Tarapur Reactors— Harmony and Risks

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The longstanding US-Indian dispute over fuel supplies and the application of safeguards at the US-supplied Tarapur nuclear power reactors has apparently become a nonissue for the Rajiv Gandhi government. In our view, New Delhi's desire to improve relations with Washington and its ability to resolve many technical problems indigenously will prevent the Tarapur reactors from becoming a problem for some time. New Delhi's current stance serves the nuclear program's goal of maximum self-reliance and minimizes US influence. The unresolved status of international safeguards at Tarapur—once the US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement expires in 1993—and the prospect of continuing safety and health problems at the facility remain potential long-term problems.

Background

The Tarapur issue began to fade in 1983 when India and the United States agreed that France would replace the United States as the fuel supplier and, in a separate understanding, that Washington would provide only those spare parts that India could not obtain elsewhere. The Indians had insisted that the bilateral agreement of 1963 obligated the United States to supply fuel and spare parts for the US-built Tarapur reactors and to allow the reprocessing of spent fuel from the power station, as required by the needs of the Indian nuclear power program. India's refusal to accept conditions imposed by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 forced prolonged discussion that led to the French connection.

Spare Parts

New Delhi is apparently satisfied with the spare parts solution. Last November, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chief Raja Ramanna told US officials that Indian companies were supplying most of the

spare parts for the Tarapur station, except for a few from West Germany and the United States. The West German Ambassador in New Delhi told our Embassy in March 1984 that German companies were providing spare parts and that a German company, KWU, had signed a service contract for the reactors. As a licensee of the US firm that built Tarapur, KWU could, in our opinion, supply most of the proprietary information the Indians would need to make highly specialized items.

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Safety—A Potential Problem

Although we believe that in the wake of the Bhopal tragedy the Indians will move toward resolving longstanding safety problems at Tarapur, in our view, India will have difficulty carrying out the extensive overhaul necessary to meet minimum standards. DAE Chairman Ramanna, according to our Embassy, wants to avoid bad publicity for the nuclear program or for himself, but, in the past, he has given higher priority to maintaining power production. Indian officials will be tempted to blame the United States for any serious incident at Tarapur.

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According to the Indian press, statements of senior Indian nuclear officials

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safety problems involving reactor operation or the potential release of radioactivity into the environment have existed at the Tarapur reactors for a long time. Ramanna told US officials last December that the reactors were operating at lower levels because of leaks in the steam generators. Such leaks could allow radioactive cooling water to escape into the environment under certain conditions. Indian technical data on Tarapur, provided to the United States under a bilateral safety cooperation agreement, confirm the presence of many safety hazards. Among

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NESA NESAR 85-011
10 May 1985

Secret

the conditions identified in the Indian papers are contamination of the reactor cooling system from defective fuel elements, corrosion in the cooling system and heat exchangers, an inadequately sized system for filtering radioactive gases from plant discharges into the environment, and problems in supplying reliable emergency power to operate the reactor cooling system in the event of a sudden shutdown. These conditions could, in our opinion, allow the contaminants in the reactor system to escape into the environment. []

Recent reporting from [] our Embassy in New Delhi, and the US Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna demonstrates that the Indians are preparing to remedy some of the apparent safety problems at the Tarapur reactors:

- In December 1983, the US IAEA Mission reported that India wanted to do destructive testing on samples of fuel from the Tarapur reactors, a procedure normally associated with the evaluation of reactor fuel performance.

not settled with the United States. The Department of Atomic Energy is buying equipment to store spent fuel at the plant in aboveground air-cooled casks, a long-term approach being considered in many countries. []

We believe that the nuclear establishment has lost interest in reprocessing Tarapur spent fuel. According to our Embassy, the PREFRE (Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing) plant, the only facility capable of handling Tarapur material, is committed for several years to handling spent fuel from India's other power reactors. The Embassy also noted last June that PREFRE was operating inefficiently. []

Now that the first of two power reactors at Madras is operating, India has the more attractive option of recovering plutonium from this wholly unsafeguarded facility. Under the US-Indian accord, any plutonium recovered from Tarapur would be subject to IAEA safeguards. We believe that India wants completely unsafeguarded plutonium to fuel its new fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam. []

Looking Far Ahead

The Tarapur question will be reopened when the US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement expires in 1993. Indian officials have told the United States they believe India's obligation to apply safeguards ends with the agreement. If, as we expect, the Tarapur reactors are decommissioned at that time—the projected end of their normal operating life—then the application of safeguards would be limited to spent fuel in storage. []

Under the most favorable circumstances, New Delhi would voluntarily decide that safeguards would continue after 1993. This would preserve the Indian legal position, avoid any confrontation with the United States, and yet represent no real compromise of the nuclear program's political or technical independence. []

Spent Fuel Storage

The Indians, in our view, have backed away from their stand that only reprocessing of spent fuel, which would lead to the recovery of plutonium, would resolve the Tarapur storage problem. Ramanna told US officials last November that spent fuel storage capacity at Tarapur was being expanded and that the fuel would not be reprocessed because the issue was

In the worst case, the Indians could be tempted to raise not only the safeguards issue but also the ultimate disposition of Tarapur spent fuel. []

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India: Where Are the MIG-29s? []

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Important questions remain about the sale and delivery of Soviet MIG-29 Fulcrum fighters to India despite extensive reporting since discussions began two years ago. Our analysis suggests that Moscow is dragging its heels, probably to build up its inventory, but also to limit the danger of technology transfer to the West, assess Rajiv Gandhi's alleged pro-Western attitudes, and forestall pressures for the MIG-29 from other Third World states. []



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Has a Contract Been Signed?

[] a contract had been signed during the visit to Moscow in July 1984 of Indian Air Marshal L. M. Katre, chief of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Shortly after Katre's return, Indian press sources began reporting the same story. It was then picked up by *Jane's Defense Weekly*. []

not comply with the short-term delivery time requested by the Indians and promised only to supply the airplane within five years. Upon returning to New Delhi, Rao stated that he had concluded the business left unfinished by Chavan in November, but no agreement on a MIG-29 contract was announced.

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We believe that India and the Soviet Union probably have reached agreement in principle on the sale of MIG-29s, but have yet to work out all of the details. Press reports indicated that contract details were left unfinished when the visit to Moscow last fall of then Indian Defense Minister Chavan was cut short by the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Embassy sources add that substantive discussions had not begun before Chavan's unexpected departure. []

The Soviets have several reasons for delaying a final contract. They probably are reassessing the Indian ability to safeguard Soviet technology. []

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that all discussions with the Soviets on the MIG-29s had been postponed until March, possibly to give the Rajiv Gandhi government time to focus on pressing domestic political matters. []

Soviets are very concerned about the security of advanced Soviet weapons following the spy scandal last January in which a French military attache was implicated. They probably are also concerned about the apparent drift in Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviets may also want to avoid providing the plane to additional Third World states; []

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Negotiations probably continued during Indian Defense Minister Rao's recent trip to the Soviet Union. Rao visited a MIG-29 base near Moscow, according to the US defense attache in Moscow. []

[] The USSR almost certainly could not supply India and other customers with considerable numbers of MIG-29s in the next

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NESA NESAR 85-011
10 May 1985

Secret

year or so without severely hindering deployments to its own forces, in our judgment. []

How Many Aircraft Are Involved?

[] the Indians expect initially 40 aircraft. [] India will eventually receive 170 MIG-29s. We believe these numbers represent the minimum and maximum acquisition. Forty MIG-29s would allow for two full squadrons of 18 aircraft each—including some trainer versions—and four attrition aircraft. []

Will the Indians Produce the MIG-29 Under License?

[]

Given India's longstanding interest in eventual coproduction of major weapon systems, it is almost certain that the two sides have discussed this issue. Signing an agreement, however, would not automatically lead to coproduction. The Indians decided not to exercise their option to produce the Mirage 2000 (some observers consider this a tactical mistake on the grounds that it could have been used as leverage against the Soviets). HAL is already assembling British Jaguar and Soviet MIG-27 attack aircraft and plans to manufacture 600 indigenously designed light combat aircraft beginning in the early 1990s. []

What Is the Delivery Schedule?

The delivery schedule apparently has slipped several times. [] [] Moscow initially considered delivering the first aircraft in late 1984 in time to boost Indira

Gandhi's reelection prospects. The next timetable, [] had the Soviets agreeing to ship the aircraft in the first quarter of 1985, with the delivery of all 40 planes to be completed within a three-month period. [] the 40 planes will be delivered in June and July, [] the first eight aircraft including two trainers will arrive late in August or September. The Soviets might turn the first plane over to the Indians during Rajiv's visit to Moscow if a deal is concluded then. Arguing against the likelihood of an imminent turnover, however, is the lack of evidence that Indian pilots have begun a MIG-29 training program. [] []

Will the Indians Receive an Export Model?

[] The [] the Indians would receive standard models of the MIG-29, identical to those provided to the Soviet Air Forces. *The Hindustan Times*, which has a relatively good record on defense subjects, reported recently that India has been promised the latest avionics for its MIG-29s. []

Foreign military attaches in New Delhi and Moscow, however, say that the Indians will get an export model. If the delivery schedule has been postponed as often as the evidence suggests, it may be an indication that the Soviets have been unwilling to part with the aircraft's most advanced subsystems. []

Where Will They Be Based?

[] the Indians plan to base the MIG-29s at Gorakhpur in east central India, over 900 km from the Pakistani border.¹ Although deploying the MIG-29s at Gorakhpur would do little to enhance India's air defenses against Pakistan, it would help the Indians hide the operational characteristics and tactics of the

¹ India plans to base its Mirage 2000s at Gwalior, 580 km from the border. []

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aircraft from Pakistani and Western intelligence.

[redacted] although the base
lacks revetments or hangarages, its location in a dense
forest provides excellent camouflage. We expect
operational MIG-29 squadrons to be based in the
western part of India to defend against Pakistani
threats. [redacted]

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Iran: Life Under the Clerics []

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An influx of Iranians seeking visas to the United States or Arab states in recent months has provided US diplomats with personal impressions of life under the clerical regime. The accounts depict a nation suffering from economic deterioration, war weariness, and disillusionment with a government widely perceived as corrupt and incompetent. None of those interviewed, however, believe the regime faces any immediate threat to its survival. []

Copenhagen are young members of wealthy families fleeing military service. []

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[] several years ago most patients were eager to get into the fighting; most now demand a medical excuse to keep them from the front. Other Iranians claim men are joining the clergy to avoid combat. []

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The Economy

Much of the discontent stems from a plunge in Iran's standard of living over the past year. Iranian visa applicants in November and December 1984 spoke of much bleaker conditions than in the previous March. They reported more items on the ration list and long lines to buy daily necessities, even though fruits and vegetables were plentiful and reasonably priced. []

Recruits come mainly from the ranks of poor rural youth, and the regime emphasizes the conscription of teenagers who can be indoctrinated into seeing the war as a crusade. Most of the Iranians interviewed expressed antipathy toward Iraq, but they did not support Khomeini's determination to fight until Saddam Husayn is ousted. []

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Popular Support

The upper and middle classes are said to be almost totally alienated from the regime. Disillusionment among the urban proletariat is increasing, leaving the lower rural classes as the regime's main prop. Despite the discontent, none of the Iranians believed the opposition posed a serious threat to the regime or saw much chance for exile groups to exploit the regime's problems. []

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The black market is flourishing. Almost any item—including European consumer goods—can be bought, albeit at inflated prices. []

Unemployment is a serious problem and getting worse. [] even many middle-class entrepreneurs are out of work. Shortages of raw materials and spare parts are cutting into industrial production. []

last July 30 percent of all factories were either shut down or operating well below capacity because of such shortages. []

[] periodic power outages and a decayed transportation system were also hurting commerce.

[]

A Tehran resident and his American wife estimated more than 90 percent of the capital's residents are critical of the regime. Cabdrivers, bazaar merchants, and others criticize the war and the government's mishandling of the economy. There are increasingly frequent references to life under the Shah as the "good old days." An Esfahan resident, on the other hand, described his city as a stronghold of radical support for the regime. []

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Attitudes Toward the War

Virtually everyone was sick of the war with Iraq but believed it would go on. Attempts to dodge military service are increasing. Villages that previously provided many volunteers now either prevent recruiters from entering or hide their young men. Many of the Iranians seeking political asylum in

Businessmen frequently say corruption is worse now than under the Shah. The main beneficiaries are the

mullahs and the Revolutionary Guard—Iran's new ruling elite. Supplies of raw materials, letters of credit, and electricity cannot be assured without payoffs. [redacted]

Some visa applicants in early January reported the Revolutionary Guard had eased up on patrolling to enforce proper social behavior. One said the Guards know they lack popular support and realize they cannot push too far. Another noted that the Guards roaming Tehran's streets were polite to the people they stopped, provided they found no contraband. Another said the *komitehs*—the revolutionary committees established to monitor adherence to Islamic practices—modified their violence somewhat during the past year. A former Guardsman, however, said the Guards continue to stop people, enter homes, and kill with impunity. [redacted]

[redacted]

The regime's insistence on religious and loyalty tests for selecting students and faculty has lowered educational standards at the university level. This poses serious questions about Iran's ability to train the experts needed to run the country. [redacted]

Attitudes Toward Americans

Many of the Iranians reported that anti-American sentiment is much less widespread and intense than in the early days of the revolution. The American wife of an Iranian said last month that Americans can live in Iran without harassment as long as they conform to local standards. Her husband said he had experienced no official discrimination. [redacted]

An American [redacted] however, said she had suffered increasing anti-American harangues, apparently because the United States is blamed for the continuation of the war. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Doha reports Iranians still shop heavily there. The major items carried home are television sets, video recorders, cameras, and anything to do with Michael Jackson. [redacted]

Conclusions

The Iranians' comments—most of which were made before the recent spate of antiregime demonstrations—support the assessment that the regime is facing problems for which it has few easy solutions. Its immediate survival is not threatened because of the weakness of its opponents and its firm control of the instruments of power. Frustration with the war—reinforced by costly and fruitless offensives—is the main rallying point for popular discontent. [redacted]

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Iran: The Grand Ayatollahs of Qom

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The influential grand ayatollahs of Qom are discreetly backing antiwar protests to gain support for their conservative views. These clerics hope to block radical-sponsored legislation on land reform, foreign trade, and new taxes. They object to government interference with the economy and private property. They also want to bring about a regime in which clerics play a more limited, advisory role. The influence of the grand ayatollahs is likely to increase after Ayatollah Khomeini dies, since his heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, lacks Khomeini's popular support and religious stature.

Background

The three grand ayatollahs in Iran's holy city of Qom—the top-ranking religious authorities in Iran besides Grand Ayatollah Khomeini—do not support the kind of Islamic regime Khomeini is attempting to institutionalize. Grand Ayatollahs Musavi-Golpayegani, Marashi-Najafi, and Shariat-Madari all oppose Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e-faqih*, or rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent. They further believe that clerics must not play a direct role in running the government, but instead should provide general guidance to ensure that the regime acts in accordance with Islamic precepts. Their opposition has been important in helping to block government proposals for land reform, nationalization of foreign trade, and new civil taxes, all of which they regard as un-Islamic.

The issue of choosing Khomeini's successor is a major point of contention between these senior clerics and Khomeini. They oppose Khomeini's heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, partly because they are convinced he will continue Khomeini's policies, but also because they believe he lacks the credentials to become supreme jurisprudent. In 1983 they rejected as inadequate a thesis submitted to them by Montazeri in a bid for acceptance into their ranks,

Organizing Dissent

Although these senior clerics have criticized the regime on specific issues, they have made only limited

Grand Ayatollahs of Qom

Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, about 83, is the spiritual leader of Iran's 10 million Turkic speakers. He opposes Khomeini's concept of a theocratic state and favors clerical noninvolvement in government.

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Ayatollah Marashi-Najafi, about 87, opposes Ayatollah Montazeri as Khomeini's successor and has support among conservatives. He is described as timid and in ill health. A grandson has served in a senior administrative post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Ayatollah Musavi-Golpayegani, about 89, has a wide network of former students. He opposes land reform and the regime's tax policies as un-Islamic, but he lends some support to the regime. His son-in-law is a member of the Council of Guardians, which reviews all legislation.

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efforts to organize opposition movement. This is because of both their belief that clerics should not take a direct role in secular affairs and their lack of a positive political program. Moreover, Ayatollahs Musavi-Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi, while largely critical of the regime, have supported certain of its policies

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Regime efforts to curb the influence of Grand Ayatollah Shariat-Madari probably have added to the opposition ayatollahs' reluctance to challenge the regime directly. The regime moved harshly against

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supporters of Shariat-Madari in 1980 when they staged protests against the proposed Islamic constitution. Regime security forces destroyed the headquarters of Shariat-Madari partisans, killing several, and a number of Azerbaijani political leaders known to support the Grand Ayatollah were executed for plotting against the government. In 1982 Shariat-Madari was placed under house arrest in Qom—he was released last month—for alleged complicity in a coup attempt. Shariat-Madari's students were dispersed, and he was prohibited from receiving religious donations, [REDACTED]

Recently, the grand ayatollahs in Qom appear to have renewed cooperation with Grand Ayatollah Tabatabai-Qomi of Mashhad to put pressure on the regime. Although the ayatollahs in Qom have not challenged the government as openly as Tabatabai-Qomi—he issued a public statement against the war—Musavi-Golpayegani recently allowed an unsigned leaflet to be circulated in which he termed the war with Iraq un-Islamic and urged a negotiated settlement. [REDACTED]

Supporters of the grand ayatollahs in Qom and Mashhad also have been organizing antiwar protests following the latest Iraqi air raids and have been disseminating antiregime propaganda, [REDACTED]

Growing Support

The government's attempt to centralize clerical authority probably has strengthened support among local clerics for the opposition ayatollahs. Some local clerics have begun to echo popular criticisms of the regime in their sermons. They resent demands by government-appointed Friday prayer leaders that the people donate more to the war effort and less to local mosques—and the local social services they support—and fear that government actions are turning the populace against the clergy, [REDACTED]

Government attempts to control the economy and raise funds for the war effort also have strengthened the ties between middle-class bazaar merchants and conservative clerics. This is a particular source of concern to the regime because bazaar merchants

played a key role in bringing Khomeini to power by providing money and other resources. Last year bazaaris from Tehran visited Ayatollahs Musavi-Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi to deliver religious donations and to seek an authoritative ruling on whether they must pay taxes to the government, [REDACTED]

The ayatollahs subsequently proclaimed that the faithful need only contribute to the mosque. Since 1982, the government has collected only 30 percent of property and income taxes, and only a small percentage of this amount has come from the merchant class. [REDACTED]

Over the past year, the bazaaris have shown an increased willingness to engage in antigovernment protests organized by the conservative clerics. When an antiregime leaflet attributed to Shariat-Madari was distributed in the Tabriz bazaar last year, it produced several days of orderly demonstrations, [REDACTED]

Most participants in antigovernment protests in Mashhad sponsored by followers of Grand Ayatollah Tabatabai-Qomi last November were bazaar merchants, [REDACTED]

Khomeini Seeks Reconciliation

Khomeini continues to try to resolve his differences with the grand ayatollahs in Qom. He sent his son Ahmad, Speaker of the Majles Rafsanjani, and President Khamenei to Qom last year to discuss the ayatollahs' opposition to clerical rule and to new civil taxes to fund the war, [REDACTED]

Moreover, last spring Khomeini sought to resolve the senior clerics' objections to an article in the constitution calling for the nationalization of foreign trade. He ordered a secret session of the Majles to pass a resolution stating that most foreign trade can be conducted by private businessmen rather than the government. [REDACTED]

Both Khomeini and Ayatollah Montazeri have modified their views on government intervention in the economy to mollify the concerns of the conservative clerics and bazaaris. In August, Khomeini declared that private enterprise should be encouraged, and directed the government to remove restrictions on businessmen. Montazeri recently has

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maintained that the private sector should take over from the government the responsibility for the distribution of certain goods.

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Outlook

In the coming months the grand ayatollahs of Qom probably will step up their behind-the-scenes efforts to put pressure on the regime to end the war. They will try to exploit growing popular unhappiness with the conflict to gain support for their views on other issues, such as opposition to land reform and new taxes. They are unlikely to confront Khomeini publicly—such as by issuing proclamations attacking his views—unless legislation they consider un-Islamic becomes law.

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A key aim is to block efforts by radicals to have Ayatollah Montazeri named as Khomeini's sole successor. They hope to force the regime to implement instead a leadership council of three to five clerics that would include some senior conservatives. Their ultimate goal is to promote a regime in which clerics play a more limited role.

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These senior clerics almost certainly will be able to wield greater political influence after Khomeini dies. Ayatollah Montazeri has far less popular and clerical support than Khomeini or the grand ayatollahs of Qom; nor do Montazeri's pronouncements carry the religious authority theirs are accorded. At least initially, Montazeri probably would have to be extremely careful not to alienate these senior clerics, and his caution should strengthen the ability of the conservatives to advance their political agenda

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Muslim Brotherhood: New Phase, New Threat

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The Muslim Brotherhood's current emphasis on political moderation, education, and recruitment of youth, in our view, is designed to increase its popular appeal and to reduce government harassment. The Brotherhood's move toward legitimacy will probably increase the acceptability of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs by the political mainstream in Muslim societies. []

[] The leaders do not consider Mubarak an ideal Islamic leader for Egypt, but they believe he is the best leader they can hope for from the Egyptian political system. They fear that violent confrontation with Mubarak would only turn Egyptians away from the Brotherhood, and instead they will try to increase Brotherhood membership by legitimate means in all segments of Egyptian society. []

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Decision To Change Tactics

We believe that during the last two years the Muslim Brotherhood has come to the conclusion that it must seek accommodation with moderate governments because earlier confrontational policies brought only repression, torture, and banishment. Security crackdowns in Syria and Egypt most likely loomed large in this decision:

The Brotherhood has tried to change its image in the past few years:

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- A coup plot against Syrian President Assad led to the siege of Brotherhood headquarters in Hama, 20,000 deaths, and the imprisonment of 10,000 Muslim Brothers in 1982.
- Although the Brotherhood was not implicated in the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat, many of its leaders were imprisoned and its publications banned. []

- It announced the disbanding of its secret militia and an end to recruiting for military activities. This move may be a hollow gesture []

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- As part of the opposition New Wafd Party, eight Brotherhood members were elected to the parliament last year.

Old Goals, New Tactics

More than 50 years after its founding, the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood—to enjoin governments to use *sharia* (Islamic law) and to ban activities such as the consumption of alcohol—remain unchanged. The group's confrontational approach is giving way to measured and evolutionary tactics. The Brotherhood is striving for legitimacy and more cleverly marketing its ideals to Muslim youth. These new tactics are most evident in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank. []

- It seeks formal establishment as a religious party. It anticipates that a recent lower court ruling throwing out laws limiting the formation of new parties will be upheld by the high constitutional court. (The US Embassy in Cairo believes that the high court may find a way of upholding the ruling, but in such a way as to exclude the Brotherhood.) []

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We believe that the most dangerous long-term threat to the Egyptian Government is the Brotherhood's plan to recruit students who will eventually assume positions throughout the government and private sector. Islamic fundamentalists are now the dominant political force on Egyptian campuses, and they sympathize with the Brotherhood's goals, although more militant fundamentalists argue that the Brotherhood leadership lacks dynamism and has sold out to the government. The Brotherhood also gives financial aid to needy pious students and offers all

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Egypt. Last year at a meeting in Saudi Arabia during the hajj, Egyptian Brotherhood leaders decided to improve relations with the Mubarak government to operate more effectively in Egypt. The majority of the approximately 100 Brotherhood leaders present favored a nonconfrontational strategy. []

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Secret

NESA NESAR 85-011
10 May 1985

Secret

students food, clothing, textbooks, and other supplies at bargain prices [redacted]

Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is tolerated in Jordan, is attempting to expand its role in Jordanian education to win more youthful converts, [redacted]

- Brotherhood members employed by the Ministry of Education help members and sympathizers find jobs in the Jordanian secular educational system.
- Professors from Jordan University, a Brotherhood stronghold, lecture against US Middle East policies, materialism, and secularism and call for a return to Islamic values. [redacted]

[redacted] Brotherhood leaders believe King Hussein tacitly supports their cause. [redacted] They take advantage of the security service's uncertainty over the King's attitude and its resulting reticence to crack down on Muslim clerics who criticize the government. [redacted]

[redacted] the security service allows the Brotherhood to operate openly because Brotherhood members are well placed in the Ministries of Education, Culture, Interior, and Religious Trusts. Security officials also permit the Brotherhood to function because it acts as an escape valve for individuals who otherwise may join the PLO and other secular groups. [redacted]

West Bank. The Brotherhood is a growing force in the West Bank. Brotherhood leaders believe these tactics—developing a youthful Islamic following—are making inroads into the West Bank's economically and politically distressed society. Its aims are:

- To dominate West Bank universities. According to the US Consulate in Jerusalem, about a third of the students at An-Najah University—the West Bank's largest—wear conservative Islamic clothing, and as many as 70 percent sympathize with Islamic fundamentalism.

- To provide pious students with university scholarships.

- To control the educational and social functions of mosques.

- To promote fundamentalist Islamic ideals in rural villages. [redacted]

[redacted] The Brotherhood also benefits from the policies of the Israeli military government, which allows fundamentalism to flourish because the Israelis believe it divides Palestinian nationalist efforts, according to the US Consulate [redacted]

Outlook

We believe that the Muslim Brotherhood's influence will continue to make inroads into Arab societies. The Brotherhood's tactics of spreading its ideals through the educational systems to the burgeoning youthful population will help integrate fundamentalist Islamic ideals into the cultural patterns of many members of the next generation of Muslims. These more conservative youth will probably be wary of regimes with strong ties to the West and will be eager to develop Islamic-based Arab identities. The Brotherhood's moderate approach may also make some Arab regimes fearful of creating a popular backlash if they crack down on the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood must walk a tightrope to maintain both an air of legitimacy and its reputation as an antiestablishment organization. Moderation will tend to foster broader support for its goals, but the loss of the Brotherhood's militant image is likely to lead to the erosion of support among more radical followers who might seek or start Islamic groups with a more extreme outlook. [redacted]

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**Pakistan-Afghanistan:
Afghan Subversion in the
North-West Frontier Province**

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In our judgment, Kabul is trying to exploit traditional tribal rivalries in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to put pressure on Islamabad to change its policy toward Afghanistan and to disrupt insurgent activities in the border area. Although we believe this destabilization program has little chance of success, increasing unrest in the NWFP because of other factors is likely to encourage debate among President Zia's advisers about the wisdom of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy.

Unrest in the North-West

Tribesmen in the NWFP have been agitating since last September against what they see as a concerted effort by Islamabad to curb traditional tribal prerogatives, including heroin processing, fugitive harboring, and arms trading. Islamabad has historically exercised only loose control through its political agents in the six tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan, allowing the tribes to keep their *jirgas* or local councils as the supreme legal bodies in the area. Relations between the tribes and the central government began to deteriorate in 1982 when Islamabad launched a drive against drug producers, particularly in Khyber Agency. Islamabad's political agent in Khyber has banned all heroin processing in the area and outlawed the sale and transport of heavy weapons on roads under his control.

The paramilitary frontier corps has been battling Afridi tribal elder Wali Khan Kooki Khel, who, with from 500 to 3,000 armed followers, crisscrossed the tribal belt to rally Pushtun tribesmen against the federal government. After at least one major shootout and unsuccessful negotiations, the provincial government used artillery to destroy Wali Khan's house, but he escaped. The government is trying to negotiate with tribesmen to end Wali Khan's activities, but the US Embassy in Islamabad reports the Waziri, Afridi, and Mohmand tribes have threatened the life of the Provincial Governor for sending the Army into the tribal areas. President Zia,

***The Tribal Areas of the North-West
Frontier Province***

The British divided the North-West Frontier into a "settled area," consisting of the lowlands toward the Indus River, and a mountainous "tribal area," which covers approximately 26,900 square kilometers along 360 kilometers of the border with Afghanistan. The British never fully pacified the tribal areas and granted autonomy to the tribes in treaties signed in the late 19th century. They also gave regular cash payments to the tribes for good behavior. Pakistan inherited this system at independence, and the area's largely Pushtun tribes have continued to make and enforce their own laws and to collect taxes. Islamabad aims eventually to merge the 2.5 million tribesmen with the 6 million Pushtuns of the settled areas by expanding the road system and social services, dispensing subsidies, and playing the tribes off against each other.

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according to Foreign Ministry officials, gave the Mohmands over \$600,000 to leave the Governor alone.

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Pakistan Suspects KHAD Involvement

Although some Pakistani officials acknowledge the government's poor relations with Pushtun tribesmen have contributed to the unrest in the NWFP, some officials are trying to build a case that KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service, has played a role in the disturbances. According to the US Embassy, the Foreign Ministry estimates KHAD is spending about \$40 million on subversion, sabotage, espionage, militias, arms, and bribes in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Provincial officials told US diplomats recently that Wali Khan said publicly he is receiving support from Kabul. They claim that on one occasion

an Afghan helicopter landed in the NWFP and unloaded weapons and funds—which we believe is unlikely. [REDACTED]

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Evidence of KHAD Operations

We believe KHAD operations in the NWFP include activities against Afghan exile groups, efforts to suborn tribesmen, and limited sabotage operations and political activities.¹ KHAD operations in the NWFP have had little success thus far. [REDACTED]

- Last November, police in Peshawar arrested a member of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and KHAD agents who intended to plant a bomb at a conference of senior Afghan resistance leaders.

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- In mid-October, PPP members participated in two operations in Peshawar designed to heighten tension between Afghan refugees and Pakistanis. PPP members were said to have killed and mutilated three Pakistanis who were found hanging near a residential area inhabited by middle- and upper-class Afghan refugees. In addition, the PPP was believed responsible for the bombing of a theater frequented mostly by Afghans, in which four people were seriously injured. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Outlook

Afghan intervention in Pakistan's domestic affairs by supporting opposition political groups or Pushtunistan separatist elements in the NWFP in their activities against the Zia regime has little prospect for success, in our view. These groups are too weak to threaten the survival of the Zia regime, although they are capable of costly acts of subversion and can occasionally influence traditional tribal rivalries. [REDACTED]

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In our judgment, Zia's continued support for the Afghan insurgency will be influenced by several factors, including Pakistan's economic well-being, Zia's perception of US support and reliability as an ally, the level of Soviet military pressure along the border with Afghanistan, and the state of relations with India. The security situation in the NWFP probably is only a minor consideration in Zia's calculations. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Sri Lanka: The Tamil Insurgency and Changes in Sinhalese Elites ¹

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An Introduction to Political Elites

In a study of elite structures in Ceylon published in 1964, the first postcolonial government in 1948 was characterized as the most Westernized stratum of the society, those who most clearly approximated the British themselves. In terms of social background, this group was dominated by politicians who were:

- A broad mix of Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim.
- Largely Christian.
- Mostly high caste.
- Highly urbanized.
- Highly Western educated.
- Largely engaged in Westernized technical and professional occupations.
- From the highest economic and social class.

In contrast, the current political elite is:

- Overwhelmingly Sinhalese.
- Heavily Buddhist.
- Increasingly lower caste.
- Less educated and less English educated.
- Largely rural.
- Increasingly drawn from traditional occupations.
- Increasingly recruited among the middle economic and social classes.

These sociological shifts parallel attitudinal changes throughout the leadership elite. The relatively Westernized group that inherited the colonial administration from the British had internalized the

English value and organizational systems and attempted to maintain and extend those models. In 1948 the opposite end of the political spectrum was heavily weighted by the traditional leaders of the agrarian society. Steeped in indigenous culture and values, these people formed a strong core of what could be called the ethnic nationalists. Between these two groups stood the people identified in the 1964 study as the "emerging elite" who were recruited into the political process in increasing numbers between 1956 and 1964. These people in the middle had been influenced by both schools of thought. Largely educated in English, they lived their everyday life in Sinhalese. Although they worked to modernize the country, they hoped to do it in a specifically Sinhalese fashion.

The author of the 1964 study then believed this emerging group would be recruited in ever greater numbers into the leadership ranks of the country. But it appears that in recent years this stratum is being displaced by increasing numbers of traditionalists. Although there is no hard evidence to prove this hypothesis, the group characterized in 1964 as "the middle people" is now at the far right of the political spectrum. This change is a result not of their having moved, but of a shift in Sri Lanka's political center of gravity over the last 20 years. This segment of society is increasingly only competent in Sinhala, largely lower caste, more often rural, and often from lower-middle backgrounds. Political events over the last two years demonstrate clearly the repercussions of these changes for relations between the Tamils and Sinhalese.

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Shifts in Specific Sinhalese Social Strata

Changes in the national civil service since 1948 illustrate the shift to the Sinhalese traditionalists. The British had favored Tamil applicants to the civil service for a number of reasons, but in general because of their high educational standards and general level of English fluency. Succeeding Sinhalese

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-011
10 May 1985

Secret

governments reduced the Tamil dominance through a series of maneuvers that favored Sinhalese traditionalists, such as:

- Replacing the previous merit system with a recruitment program heavily dependent on party sponsorship.
- Increasing use of Sinhalese in the everyday running of government.
- Constant reiteration of the Sri Lanka/Sinhalese/Sinhala theme in national publications and government pronouncements.

These changes largely originated with Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) efforts beginning in the late 1950s—the “Sinhala Only” program—but have had lasting effects on subsequent administrations. They have reduced the level of professionalism within the civil service from the high standards of uncorruptibility and independence inherited from the British to the current situation in which government service is a function of party patronage and executive manipulation. One can conclude that the civil service under the United National Party (UNP) government of President Jayewardene is more Sinhalese chauvinist in attitude than the earlier socialist regimes of the SLFP.

The Tamil minority traditionally dominated the financial and mercantile sections of Ceylonese society, a trend that persisted until the early 1960s. Although government policy did not overtly favor one ethnic group over another, under the SLFP governments of the mid-1960s and early 1970s, increasing nationalization of key industries and growing government control of all sectors of the economy made competition more difficult for businessmen, resulting in a period of Sinhalese and Tamil capital flight. This exodus of established businessmen probably reduced the competition for aspiring small-scale Sinhalese entrepreneurs, making it possible for them to survive the difficult SLFP years. Under Jayewardene’s liberalization program, begun in 1977, small businesses have been encouraged once again, and many nationalized concerns have been returned to the private sector. The new opportunities that have opened up have largely gone to Sinhalese small businessmen poised to take advantage of the situation and actively encouraged by the largely Sinhalese government.

In 1948 the professional classes in Sri Lanka were similarly dominated by the Tamil minority and for much the same reasons as the bureaucracy. With the increasing “Sinhalization” of the country beginning in 1956, Westernized, English-educated Sinhalese found themselves at nearly the same disadvantage as Tamils. Although exact figures are unavailable, interviews with Ceylonese expatriates from both communities strongly suggest that the resulting brain drain was severe. On the basis of findings from other cross-national analyses, one can conclude that the Sinhalese-trained newcomers who quickly moved to fill the void left by the flight of Tamil and Sinhalese professionals were in comparison more nationalistic, more chauvinistic, and more provincial in their world views and values. The overall effect of this process was to enrich the opportunities of one stratum of society (the Sinhalese-trained conservative traditionalists) at the expense of another (the Westernized liberal sections of both Tamil and Sinhalese society).

The landed Sinhalese upper-caste gentry, the *goviyagama* Buddhist caste, prospered the most during 1956-77. Conservative to begin with, wedded to the traditional values of Sinhalese society, it is not likely that the gentry would be upset by a return to traditional values—including the claim of “Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese.” The changes going on in Sri Lankan society accurately reflected this caste’s traditionalist views. Although there are no empirical data to substantiate this, the few *goviyagama* who were disadvantaged by the policies of the SLFP regimes may have been that small subset of Western-educated and wealthy families who might have emigrated at this time.

Small but Culturally Important Groups

Since the 1960s, other groups have moved into positions of power and have become a political force to reckon with. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, lacking an effective political organization of his own, won the national election of 1956 by mobilizing Buddhist monks, indigenous rural doctors, and Sinhalese village schoolteachers around his Sinhalese chauvinist rhetoric. All three groups have a vested interest in—as well as an emotional and intellectual commitment

Secret

to—Sinhalese nationalism. According to the scholarly research, these three groups are highly chauvinistic and resistant to Westernization or liberalization. They are the repositories of traditional wisdom, literature, and classical values. The monk, teacher, and local doctor form the core of traditional culture in each Sinhalese village. Once their political aspirations were mobilized—more than 30 years ago—they remained a significant force for succeeding generations of politicians to contend with.

Most important among these newly politicized groups is the national military. Since independence, the role of the largely Sinhalese military has grown and changed in ways that strongly influence communal affairs in the island as well as every other aspect of life. As in most postcolonial countries, the officer corps was a residue of British officers, plus Sinhalese and Tamils trained by the British, all of whom were intimately bound up with the ethos of professional military camaraderie and largely apolitical. Ethnically, the officer corps traditionally was dominated by large numbers of Malays and thoroughly Westernized Christian Sinhalese and Tamils. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her SLFP systematically replaced this stratum of military leadership with Sinhalese Buddhist officers from the lower ranks. This stratum of political appointees has worked its way up through the ranks and now dominates much of the higher command. The military became further politicized, Sinhalized, and conservative following its enlargement after the Sinhalese insurgency of 1971.

An unanticipated byproduct of the ethnic and sociological changes in the military has been to increase the likelihood of a military coup against the government. This threat was very unlikely as long as the military was perceived both by the government and command as an apolitical, professional service. But Colombo has steadily altered the ethnic makeup of the services—increasingly rural, Sinhalese, and less educated—and its mandate—more involved in anti-insurgency and domestic control issues—thereby increasing the sense of identification and involvement of the military with the Sinhalese population at large. Although Sirimavo Bandaranaike may have successfully made the military more dependent upon her particular leadership, she also set in motion the

increasing politization of the services and consequently the potential for a military coup against Colombo.

The military is a powerful new force that all politicians must court. It has a strong Sinhalese chauvinist bias and the guns to back its preferences. Potential political reconciliation with the Tamils is a volatile issue with the military, and Sinhalese leaders must bear this powerful constraint in mind in their bargaining with Tamil separatists. Efforts at political reconciliation with the Tamils are tempered by the knowledge that the final conclusion must meet the Sinhalese military's concerns as well.

Organized labor and the trade union movement are relatively modern developments in Sri Lanka and initially grew out of organizing efforts of the leftist parties in the island. They have come under the increasing sway of party politicians. Large mobs of labor union members have become a standard feature of electioneering. Several scholars illustrate the growing role of organized labor in Sri Lankan politics with the example of the Janika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS, or the National Workers Organization). Although this group was quite small before 1977, under the direction of its president Cyril Mathew, until recently Minister of Industries and Rural Development, it has grown and subsumed many lesser government workers' unions and become a political force in its own right.

According to research done by Gananath Obeyesekere, the JSS had a large hand in manipulating the riots of summer 1983, and Jayewardene was not willing to reprove them, fearing loss of political support from this important group. Obeyesekere has noted that other ministers of the UNP government have similarly sponsored the growth of unions loyal to them that can provide them with political muscle when necessary. He has singled out Prime Minister R. Premadasa and Transport Minister M. H. Mohamed and two who have capitalized on the use of political patronage since the freeing of the economy in 1977 to build private thug groups. Obeyesekere also notes that many of the newly formed labor groups have been brought under the

Secret

overall direction of the JSS, making it the most powerful labor group in the country. Its ideology is strident Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, and, given its reputed willingness to use thuggery to achieve its purposes, it is clearly a power to be reckoned with.

Academic observers of the Sri Lankan political scene have also identified changes in the role of the *mudalalis*, a Sinhalese term that incorporates the sense of petty bourgeois, shopkeeper, middleman, and small businessman. Eric Meyer, in particular, notes that this group has developed strong ties to the underworld and has become notorious for its corruption of the security forces and the police. Over the years this group has grown into a cohesive force that increasingly turns to the use of thugs to protect its property and intimidate its competition, which historically has been predominantly Tamil merchants. These mudalalis have risen in power and influence, particularly in small rural towns. As Eric Meyer has noted, the "activities of the mudalalis do not in themselves explain the organized manner in which the riots [of July 1983] began, but they were in large measure responsible for their extension." There is growing evidence [redacted] implicating the mudalalis in the growing ethnic tensions between Tamils and Muslims in the eastern province.

A final group that appears to be emerging in the equation of Sinhalese power is the leadership stratum that is developing within the new villages being established in the Dry Zone as a result of the burgeoning national irrigation program. Large areas of the northeast have come under rice cultivation in the last two decades, and particularly since the inauguration of the Accelerated Mahaweli Program in 1977. Although there are no empirical data to support this hypothesis, several commentators, both Tamil and Sinhalese, have observed the similarity between these new villages and the Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Although the program was started to benefit the entire country, there is little doubt that Colombo's decision to arm and train the Sinhalese settlers that will be settled in these predominantly Tamil areas will intimidate both Tamil moderates and

insurgents. Further, this program of ethnically directed settlement clearly ties the economic interests of these formerly landless Sinhalese peasants to Jayewardene, his UNP government, and that administration's goals for a unitary state. How well these new settlements will fare in the long run in the face of Tamil insurgent pressures remains to be seen, but, if they persevere, their leaders could become a new and perhaps powerful Sinhalese interest group with clearly defined political allegiances.

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